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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1
The Revere America Foundation (“Revere America”) is an advocacy
organization dedicated to advancing common sense public policies rooted in
America’s traditions of individual freedom and free markets. Revere
America supports and advocates reform of our health care system through
measures that are compatible with these values, including improving access
to medical care, providing incentives for innovation and encouraging
competition. Revere America opposes stripping Americans of the freedom to
make their own individual decisions about medical care by forcing people to
purchase health insurance or incur a government penalty.

1

The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for
any party authored this brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or entity,
other than amicus and its counsel, make a monetary contribution to the
preparation and submission of this brief. See Fed. R. App. P. 29.
1
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The importance of this case cannot be overstated, for it presents this
Court with a rare instance in which it must face its “responsibility to
confront the great questions of the proper federal balance in terms of lasting
consequences for the constitutional design.” United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring). At issue is whether
Congress has authority under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause to enact, for the first time in American history, a law
compelling individual Americans to purchase a consumer product that they
do not want. Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
contains an individual mandate (“Individual Mandate”) that seeks to compel
most people to purchase health insurance policies by 2014. See Pub. L. No.
111-148, § 1501(b), § 10106, 124 Stat. 119, 244, 907 (2010).
Although the Supreme Court’s modern Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has gradually eliminated the distinction between interstate and
intrastate commerce, the Court has never doubted its “duty to recognize
meaningful limits on the commerce power of Congress,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at
580 (Kennedy, J., concurring), lest the limited and enumerated powers
granted in Article I become the general federal police power that the
Framers deliberately withheld. The Court has insisted, accordingly, that

2
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Congress’ commerce power be confined to the regulation of “economic
activity.” See id. at 567 (opinion of the Court).
The Individual Mandate, however, is triggered not by economic
activity, but rather by an individual’s private decision not to engage in
economic activity. Section 1501 regulates inactivity, conscripting unwilling
individuals into the commercial market to buy an unwanted product. The
Individual Mandate thus introduces compulsory commerce into the
American economy – commerce that Congress not only regulates, but
creates. If Congress has power to regulate inactivity in this fashion, then
one is “hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate.” Id. at 564 (emphasis added). Such a sweeping
regulatory power effectively ousts the states of their reserved governmental
powers and thus violates the Tenth Amendment.
But the Individual Mandate commits a constitutional offense that is
graver still. For the Individual Mandate operates directly on individuals, and
to the extent that it exceeds Congress’ enumerated powers, it infringes on the
retained constitutional rights of the people, rights specifically protected by
the Ninth Amendment. And while it is difficult to posit what Congress
could not do with the regulatory power it claims here, it is not at all difficult
to posit what it could do. Indeed, Congress’ own budget office, concerned

3
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that federally mandated private expenditures ought to be included in the
federal budget, understood that implementation of such a power could lead
to, “[i]n the extreme, a command economy, in which the President and the
Congress dictated how much each individual and family spent on all goods
and services. . . .” CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE MEMORANDUM:
Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 9
(1994) (“CBO MEMORANDUM”). Our Constitution grants Congress no such
power.
ARGUMENT
THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE EXCEEDS CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE.
I.

THE GOVERNMENT CONCEDES THAT THE INDIVIDUAL
MANDATE LIES AT THE OUTER LIMITS OF THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE, AS AUGMENTED BY THE NECESSARY AND PROPER
CLAUSE.

The court below upheld the Individual Mandate as “within Congress’
authority under the Commerce Clause” standing alone, and therefore found
it “unnecessary to consider whether the provision[] would be [a]
constitutional exercise[] of power pursuant to … the Necessary and Proper
Clause.” Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *39
(W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2010). This is plainly wrong. The Government itself
conceded below that it must rely on the Necessary and Proper Clause to
4

Case: 10-2347 Document: 17

Date Filed: 01/25/2011

Page: 10

sustain the Individual Mandate. Govt. Mem. in Support of Motion to
Dismiss at 1, 23, 27; Govt. Reply Mem. at 7. The Individual Mandate
regulates neither the “channels of interstate commerce” nor
“instrumentalities[,] … persons or things in interstate commerce,” Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 16-17 (2005), and the Government does not contend
otherwise. Therefore the mandate lies beyond Congress’ Commerce Clause
power and can be sustained, if at all, only as an exercise of power under the
Necessary and Proper Clause to “regulate purely local activities that are part
of an economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.” Id. at 17. See Govt. Mem. at 27. “[U]nlike the channels,
instrumentalities, and agents of interstate commerce, activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce are not themselves part of interstate
commerce, and thus the power to regulate them cannot come from the
Commerce Clause alone. Rather, as [the Supreme Court] has acknowledged
since at least United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838), Congress’
regulatory authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of
interstate commerce (including activities that have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and Proper Clause.”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). See, e.g.,
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964).

5
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The Government, accordingly, seeks to defend the Individual Mandate
as necessary to ensure the effectiveness of Congress’ principal reforms of
the interstate health care and health insurance markets: extending coverage
to those with costly preexisting medical conditions and preventing premiums
based on individual medical history. Unless everyone is required by law to
purchase health insurance (or to pay a penalty), the revenue base will be
insufficient to underwrite the costs of insuring individuals presently deemed
high risk or uninsurable. Therefore, the Government reasons, insofar as
Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to reform the interstate
health insurance market, it also possesses, under the Necessary and Proper
Clause, power to make the regulation effective by imposing the Individual
Mandate. Govt. Mem. at 26-29.
As we demonstrate below, however, if Congress has power to regulate
“commerce” in the health insurance market by commanding unwilling
individuals to engage in specific commercial transactions in that market,
there is no principled reason why it cannot likewise regulate commerce by
issuing similar commands in virtually any other market for goods and
services. And such a breathtaking, wholly unprecedented regulatory power
would “bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce

6
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Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.” Lopez,
514 U.S. at 567.
II.

CONGRESS HAS NO POWER TO COMPEL AN UNWILLING
INDIVIDUAL TO ENTER THE STREAM OF COMMERCE TO
PURCHASE AN UNWANTED PRODUCT.
A.

None of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause
Decisions Authorizes Regulation of Inactivity.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Lopez, provides the framework for
analyzing assertions of congressional power that lie at the outermost reaches
of the Commerce and the Necessary and Proper Clauses – particularly
assertions that are without precedent. In Lopez, the Court invalidated a
federal statute criminalizing possession of guns near schools. Noting that
“even the[] modern-era precedents which have expanded congressional
power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this power is subject to
outer limits,” id. at 556-57, the Court found in those precedents the common
feature that they all involved the regulation of some type of “economic
activity” that affected interstate commerce, id. at 559. See id. at 560 (“Even
Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity.”). See
also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000) (“Gendermotivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity. . . . [T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld
7
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Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is
economic in nature.”).
The activity at issue in Lopez fell outside these precedents because it
was not meaningfully “connected with a commercial transaction” or
otherwise economic in nature. 514 U.S. at 561. And because the
Government could offer no limiting principle that would prevent
congressional authority to regulate noneconomic activity under the
Commerce Clause from becoming “a general federal police power,” id. at
564, the federal ban on gun possession near schools could not be squared
with the fundamental principle that the congressional “powers enumerated in
the Constitution” must be “interpreted as having judicially enforceable outer
limits.” Id. at 566. “[I]f we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we
are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is
without power to regulate.” Id. at 564.
The Lopez Court thus distilled from precedent the rule that the subject
of the challenged congressional regulation must involve “economic
activity.” 514 U.S. at 559, 560, 561, 567. The Lopez analysis compels
invalidation of the Individual Mandate. For even assuming that an
individual’s decision not to buy health insurance is economic in nature, it is
plainly not activity. It is, indeed, a decision to refrain from activity, to

8
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remain outside the stream of commerce by choosing not to purchase health
insurance. It is, in short, inactivity. And Congress has never sought to
regulate a commercial market by commanding unwilling individuals to enter
it. To the contrary, “[e]very application of Commerce Clause power found
to be constitutionally sound by the Supreme Court involved some form of
action, transaction, or deed placed in motion by an individual or legal
entity.” Commonwealth v. Sebelius, No. 10-188, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130814, at *37-38 (E.D.Va. Dec. 13, 2010). See id. at *39 (“Neither the
Supreme Court nor any federal circuit court of appeals has extended
Commerce Clause powers to compel an individual to involuntarily enter the
stream of commerce by purchasing a commodity in the private market.”).
Indeed, when legislation imposing an Individual Mandate was first
considered (but not enacted) by Congress 16 years ago, the Congressional
Budget Office (“CBO”) concluded that “[a] mandate requiring all
individuals to purchase health insurance would be an unprecedented form of
federal action. The government has never required people to buy any good
or service as a condition of lawful residence in the United States.” CBO
MEMORANDUM at 1.
The court below agreed that federal commerce power is limited to the
regulation of “activities,” Liberty Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at

9
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*39-44, but it nevertheless adopted the Government’s position that an
individual’s decision not to enter the marketplace constitutes the requisite
“activity.” The court reasoned that almost everyone will eventually need
health care and that, by choosing to finance such care by means other than
buying insurance now, “one becomes an active market participant, not a
passive bystander,” in the health care market. Id. at *43. Thus, “an
individual’s decision not to purchase health insurance is a form of economic
activity.” Id. at *44. This conclusion, according to the district court,
“follows from the Supreme Court’s rulings” in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111 (1942), and Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). Id. at *50. It does
not.
Wickard upheld a federal price-support program that penalized a
farmer for growing more than his statutory allotment of wheat, even though
he used it solely for his own family and livestock. The Supreme Court
reasoned that Congress could rationally conclude that a decision by many
farmers to grow their own wheat, rather than entering the marketplace to buy
grain, could in the aggregate affect prices and undermine the congressional
program. Here, according to the court below, “Plaintiffs’ preference for
paying for health care needs out of pocket rather than by purchasing
insurance on the market is much like the preference of the plaintiff farmer in

10
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Wickard for fulfilling his demand for wheat by growing his own rather than
by purchasing it.” Id. But the congressional scheme at issue in Wickard
imposed a penalty not on farmer Filburn’s mere passive “preference,” but on
his affirmative activity of actually producing grain. Wickard, 317 U.S. at
127-29. Production of wheat or any other commodity fits easily within the
Supreme Court’s definition of “activities” that “are quintessentially
economic. ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production, distribution, and
consumption of commodities.’ ” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25. See also Lopez, 514
U.S. at 559-60 (describing Wickard as involving “intrastate economic
activity” in the form of “production and consumption of homegrown
wheat”). The regulation at issue in Wickard, unlike the Individual Mandate,
did not command farmer Filburn to grow wheat, nor did it compel him, or
anyone else, to buy it. Rather, Congress subjected farmer Filburn to federal
regulation only if, and when, he voluntarily engaged in the activity of
producing wheat.
The district court points to the problem of “free riders” – those who
do not buy health insurance but then demand free treatment in hospital
emergency rooms when they get sick, thereby shifting the cost of their care
to the hospital, the government, or other insured parties (in the form of
higher premiums), since hospitals that participate in Medicare are forbidden

11
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from refusing medical treatment on the basis of ability to pay. Liberty Univ.,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *41-43. But that problem is of Congress’
own creation, and it cannot bootstrap itself into powers not enumerated by
the Constitution simply because it deems the exercise of those powers to be
useful in light of other regulations that it has previously enacted. A federal
program, for example, requiring federally subsidized grocers to provide free
bread to those who cannot afford to buy it would not authorize a federal
regulation compelling Filburn and other farmers to grow wheat to ensure a
low-cost supply. Congress can constitutionally address the harshness of
turning away those without health insurance in a variety of ways, including
subsidizing – as it does currently in the Affordable Care Act – those who
cannot otherwise afford such insurance.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Raich, which was controlled by
Wickard, is equally inapposite. Marijuana growers, like wheat farmers, are
voluntarily engaging in a classic form of economic activity – the production
of an agricultural commodity. See Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 130814, at *35 (in Wickard and Raich, “the activity under
review was the product of a self-directed affirmative move to cultivate and
consume wheat or marijuana. This self-initiated change of position

12
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voluntarily placed the subject within the stream of commerce. Absent that
step, governmental regulation could have been avoided.”).
The Government also relies on Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 243, 251 (1964), which held that Congress has
Commerce Clause power to ban racial discrimination in public
accommodations whose operations directly affect interstate travel. The
Government contends that, because the motel owner was compelled to
engage in commercial transactions with a class of travelers he did not want
to serve, Congress was regulating inactivity. But the motel owner chose to
enter the stream of commerce by operating an inn, thereby assuming the
legal duties, both federal and state, imposed on such “public
accommodations.” See 379 U.S. at 259-60 & n.8; id. at 284-85 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).2
2

Under the Government’s sweeping theory of commerce power,
Congress would presumably have been free, upon finding that there was an
acute shortage of hotel rooms available to black travelers, to mandate that all
homeowners turn their homes into boarding houses and make rooms
available to travelers. See Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 252-53 (recounting
congressional findings of just such a shortage). Yet in Heart of Atlanta,
Congress mandated nondiscriminatory accommodations only by “those
establishments which had certain commercial characteristics,” 379 U.S. at
288 (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J., concurring), and specifically
exempted any establishment with no more than five rooms to rent “which is
actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his residence.”
Id. at 262 (appendix to the opinion of the Court)(quoting §201(b)(1) of the
Civil Rights Act).
13
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The Government’s Supposed Statutory and Lower
Court Precedents Likewise Involved No Regulation of
Inactivity.

Remarkably, the Government insists that federal laws mandating the
purchase of insurance are commonplace, which supposedly makes it “wellsettled that Congress may require private parties to enter into insurance
contracts where failing to do so would impose costs on other market
participants.” Govt. Reply Mem. at 13 & n.10 (citing nine statutes). But
every statute cited by the Government applies to particular economic acts or
endeavors, and requires any “owner” or “operator” of such property –
ranging from railroads to coal mines to property in flood zones – to buy
particular types of insurance covering risks attendant to such an activity. See
id. In each case, the owner or operator entered the marketplace voluntarily
and chose to buy or operate that property, and likewise remained free to
avoid the insurance obligation by quitting the enterprise. Such laws, even if
they had ever been sustained over a constitutional challenge – and the
Government cites no such judicial authority – do not regulate inactivity and
they therefore provide no support for the Individual Mandate here.
In its quest for precedents for the Individual Mandate, the
Government travels even farther afield, pointing out that, under the
Superfund Act, a property owner cannot avoid strict liability for

14
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environmental clean-up costs by showing that he did not cause the toxicwaste leak. Govt. Reply Mem. at 13-14. This, says the Government,
proves that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to impose mandates
on those who are “passive” or “inactive.” But any owner of a facility subject
to Superfund regulation voluntarily entered the stream of commerce and
thereby accepted the risk of strict liability imposed by federal regulation in
connection with that economic activity.3
The Government also touts a case sustaining the Child Support
Recovery Act, which “affirmatively requires child support payments in
interstate commerce.” Govt. Reply Mem. at 13 & n.9 (citing United States v.
Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996)). But that statute merely provides a federal
mechanism for enforcing state-court child-support orders when a parent
leaves the state and defaults on his legal responsibilities. In such cases the
duty to make child-support payments is imposed by state, not federal, law.
See Sage, 92 F.3d at 103-04. And states have plenary police power to
3

The only superfund case cited by the Government that presented a
Commerce Clause question – although not the question presented here – is
United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). There the court
rejected the defendant’s assertions that a statute must regulate commercial
activity “directly” in order to satisfy the Commerce Clause, and that the
government had to show that defendant’s activities, in particular, affected
interstate commerce. See id. at 1510-11. The case raised no question about
congressional power to impose mandates that compel persons to enter the
stream of commerce and buy products they do not want.
15
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mandate affirmative duties; the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses grant no such power to Congress. The Government’s reliance on
this example is thus telling, for it reveals that the Government does not grasp
the “first principles” that the Supreme Court stressed in Lopez: “The
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers. See U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 8. As James Madison wrote, ‘the powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.’ ”
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292-293 (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961)).
The Government’s next supposed precedent for the Individual
Mandate is congressional use of “eminent domain to compel the private
transfer of land in aid of the regulation of interstate commerce.” Govt. Reply
Mem. at 14. But the distinctions between eminent domain and the
Individual Mandate subvert, rather than support, the Government’s position.
First, the power of eminent domain inheres in sovereignty and is steeped in
centuries of common law dating back to Magna Carta. The Government
identifies no similar pedigree for the Individual Mandate, nor could it, since
even congressional authorities concede that this assertion of federal power is
wholly unprecedented. See CBO MEMORANDUM at iv, 1-2. Second, federal
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eminent domain power cannot be doubted, for the Fifth Amendment
expressly provides that private property cannot “be taken for public use
without just compensation.” Congressional eminent domain authority is
thus tantamount to an enumerated power, as the Supreme Court explained
more than a century ago. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897)
(“In the Fifth Article of the earliest amendments to the Constitution of the
United States … the inherent and necessary power of the Government to
appropriate private property to the public use is recognized.”). Third, the
eminent domain power imposes a mandate more on the government than on
the individual. Far from imposing a coercive monetary penalty on property
owners, as the Individual Mandate does, the Fifth Amendment requires that
the federal government pay just compensation to property owners.
Moreover, those owners entered the stream of commerce voluntarily by
acquiring their property, and although owners can be compelled to sell their
property for public use, not even the Government argues that eminent
domain would allow Congress to compel an individual to buy property that
he does not want. The contrasts between the Individual Mandate and the
Fifth Amendment’s eminent domain power are stark – and dispositive.
The other examples of affirmative mandates invoked by the
Government are likewise rooted in specific provisions enumerated in the
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Constitution. See Commonwealth v. Sebelius, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130814, at *34. The power to impose a military draft arises from Congress’
power to raise an army and navy. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13.
The power to compel the filing of tax returns arises from Congress’ power to
levy taxes, including taxes on individuals. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1;
U.S. Const. Amend. XVI. The power to require the filing of census forms
arises from Congress’ duty to conduct an “enumeration” of the population
every ten years, in order to ensure fair democratic representation. See U.S.
Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 3. And the power to compel service on a jury is rooted
in the federal government’s duty to provide jury trials for both civil and
criminal disputes. See U.S. Const. Amends. VI and VII. The Government
can offer no remotely comparable constitutional foundation for the
Individual Mandate.
Finally, nothing in these constitutional mandates “would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general
police power of the sort retained by the States.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. The
Government’s unbounded vision of the Commerce and the Necessary and
Proper Clauses, in contrast, would effectively free the federal government of
any meaningful limits on the scope of its commerce power, as we
demonstrate below.
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The Government Proffers No Genuine Limiting
Principle to Contain a Commerce Clause Power That
Is Not Tethered To Any Activity, Let Alone to
Economic Activity.
1.

The Government’s assertion that the health care
market is “unique” does not furnish a limiting
principle and, in any event, is wrong.

In Lopez, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court struck down a federal
gun-possession statute because the Government’s “hip bone connected to the
thigh bone” theory explaining why gun possession near a school
substantially affects interstate commerce had no articulable limits; the
Government could not identify a single activity that did not, under its theory,
substantially affect interstate commerce. Nor could the Court: “[I]f we were
to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.” 514
U.S. at 564. See also id. at 565 (the dissent’s “rationale lacks any real limits
because, depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked
upon as commercial”). Upholding Congress’ claimed authority to regulate
noneconomic activity that is not even remotely connected to interstate
commerce, such as simple gun possession, would thus negate the central
premise of federalism: that the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional
powers “ ‘presupposes something not enumerated.’ ” Id. at 566 (quoting
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 70 (1824)).
19
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The Individual Mandate presents the same problem, and the
Government’s only answer is that the health care market is “unique.” It
argues that upholding the Individual Mandate will “not open the floodgates”
to similar congressional mandates in other markets because “[t]he distinctive
characteristics of the health care market – a combination of universal need,
unavoidable uncertainty, and the associated cost-shifting – make it unique.”
Govt. Reply Mem. at 12. The court below adopted this rationale. Liberty
Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *48-51.
This supposed limit on individual mandates fails both as a matter of
principle and as a matter of fact. Congress’ exercise of its power to regulate
economic activity under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses is
not conditioned on the “uniqueness” of the market at issue. Accordingly,
although the supposedly “distinctive characteristics” of the health care
market, even if true, might provide policy reasons why Congress would
choose not to enact individual mandates in other areas, they certainly are not
constitutional reasons why Congress could not. Only the latter can provide a
judicially enforceable principle to cabin Congress’ exercise of its commerce
power. And the Government’s blithe assurance that a decision expanding
invasive regulatory power to unprecedented lengths will be like “a restricted
railroad ticket, ‘good for this day and train only,’ ” County of Washington v.
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Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 183 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), is fanciful at
best. Indeed, in Lopez the dissenting Justices likewise urged that
congressional regulation of gun possession near schools was a “rare case,”
due to the “particularly acute threat” posed by firearms and the “special way
in which guns and education are incompatible.” 514 U.S. at 624 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). The Lopez Court rejected the supposed “rare case” limitation as
“devoid of substance.” Id. at 564-65.
In any event, the markets for health insurance and health care are
plainly not unique. Let us start with other insurance markets. Ironically, on
the very page after it asserts that health insurance is unique, and is therefore
the only market in which Congress could impose an individual mandate, the
Government trumpets a host of federal statutes mandating various forms of
casualty, liability, and unemployment insurance for those who choose to
engage in particular economic enterprises. Govt. Reply Mem. at 13 & n.10.
Although we have already demonstrated that these laws provide no
precedent for the Individual Mandate at issue here, see supra Part II.B, it is
noteworthy that the Government itself believes there are many insurance
markets in which Congress may impose individual mandates for the benefit
of “other market participants.” Govt. Reply Mem. at 13.
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Nor would the Government’s rationale stop at mandates affecting the
insurance markets. Food, shelter, clothing, transportation, education, and
communication are all basic necessities of modern life, and everyone must
eventually participate in some way in the markets for these goods and
services. The Government offers no reason why Congress could not choose
to regulate these markets with individual mandates. Under the
Government’s rationale, for example, Congress would be empowered to
regulate grain prices not only by penalizing wheat production in excess of
the government’s quota, as it did in Wickard, but by penalizing individuals
who decide not to enter the market as consumers of bread and other grain
products.
In short, market disruptions, inefficiencies, and cost-shifting are not
unique to the health care and health insurance markets, and the Government
provides no constitutional principle that would restrain Congress from
addressing problems in other markets with its newly claimed power to
compel individuals to enter the stream of commerce and buy products that
they do not want. Long before this litigation arose, Congress’ own nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office gave credence to an outlook very
different from the brisk, rosy assurances offered by the Government here.
When the CBO reviewed the first bill contemplating an individual mandate
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16 years ago and concluded that such a measure was unprecedented, the
CBO observed that federal budgets have always distinguished between
“resource allocation decisions that involve private choice, are made in a
decentralized fashion, and are subject to the economic disciplines of the
marketplace, and resource allocation decisions that are made in a centralized
fashion at the federal level by the President and the Congress through the
governmental budget process.” CBO MEMORANDUM at 4 (quotation marks
and citation omitted). The CBO reasoned that “the essence of private choice
is the ability not to act. Decisions about resource allocation are not private
unless individuals can choose not to spend their money in response to
market forces.” Id. at 7 (emphasis in original). Congress’ budget experts had
to confront these issues because enactment of a mandate would have
required a decision about how the mandate should be treated for federal
budget purposes. With the degree of control that the federal government
would exert over mandated purchases of health insurance by individuals
who had been conscripted into commerce by congressional decree, the CBO
was concerned that the cost to individuals of complying with the mandate
ought to be counted as part of the federal budget. Id. at 6-7. The CBO then
offered this chilling warning:
Failure to record the cost of this compulsory activity in the
budget would open the door to a mandate-issuing government
23
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taking control of virtually any resource allocation decision that
would otherwise be left to the private sector, without the federal
budget recording any increase in the size of government. In the
extreme, a command economy, in which the President and the
Congress dictated how much each individual and family spent
on all goods and services, could be instituted without any
change in total federal receipts or outlays.
CBO MEMORANDUM at 9.
2.

A statute is not “proper” under the Necessary and
Proper Clause if it would negate the purpose,
embodied in Article I and the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, of enumerating, and thereby
limiting, federal power.

The Government’s argument that the Individual Mandate is
“essential” to its “larger regulatory scheme for the interstate health care
market,” Liberty Univ., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125922, at *52, even if
credited, goes only to the “Necessary” element of the Necessary and Proper
Clause.4 Even a “necessary” exercise of Commerce Clause authority must
also be “a ‘Law … proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce
Clause.’ ” Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) (quoting

4

The “necessity” identified by the Government, at bottom, is the need
for additional monetary resources. But the Internal Revenue Code is a
testament to the innumerable ways in which revenues can be raised in accord
with the Constitution, and thus a justification based on a need for additional
resources is one of least compelling showings of “necessity” imaginable. If
Congress needs more money to pay for its health care reforms, it has plenty
of constitutional options available to it.
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Art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added by the Court).5 In Chief Justice
Marshall’s words, for a law to be “proper,” it must “consist with the letter
and spirit of the Constitution.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421
(1819). The Individual Mandate fails this test because it is inconsistent with
– indeed, it negates – the “first principle[]” that Article I “creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers” that are “ ‘few and defined.’ ” Lopez,
514 U.S. at 552 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45). Under the Government’s
theory, Congress can impress unwilling individuals into commerce and
compel them to buy unwanted products whenever doing so is deemed by
Congress to be essential to some larger regulatory plan.6
That makes this case actually easier to decide than Lopez. There, the
Supreme Court balked at the degree of attenuation in the causal connection
between the regulated “actors” and the ultimate effect of “their conduct” on
commerce. 514 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 55961, 565-67 (opinion of the Court). Although the Court admitted that “some
of our prior cases have taken long steps down [the] road” toward granting
Congress a general police power by “giving great deference to
5

It is this sort of catch-all analysis that has made the Necessary and
Proper Clause the “last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires
congressional action.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 923.
6

When the British navy impressed Americans into service in 1812,
President James Madison deemed it casus belli.
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congressional” programs regulating activities with remote effects on
commerce, id. at 567, the Court drew the line at “a criminal statute that by
its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.” Id. at 561.
But the Individual Mandate strains the concept of commerce even
more than the gun possession statute in Lopez, for it reflects not a difference
in degree from prior exercises of Commerce Clause power, but a difference
in kind. Again, the Individual Mandate reaches beyond economic “actors”
to command even those who have decided not to act; it regulates not
“activity” but inactivity. And ordering unwilling individuals into the
marketplace to buy unwanted products goes where even Congress has
heretofore never ventured.7 Far from what Chief Justice Marshall described
as “the natural, direct and appropriate means, or the known and usual
means, for the execution of a given power,” JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 186 (Gerald Gunther ed. 1969) (emphasis

7

Indeed, Congress’ own staff warned that the Individual Mandate
may exceed its powers, noting that it may “be questioned whether a
requirement to purchase health insurance is really a regulation of an
economic activity or enterprise, if individuals who would be required to
purchase health insurance are not, but for this regulation, a part of the health
insurance market.” CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, Requiring
Individuals to Obtain Health Insurance: A Constitutional Analysis 6 (2009)
(emphasis added).
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added), the Individual Mandate is the ultimate form of congressional
bootstrapping: unwilling individuals are first drafted into the health
insurance market and then their involuntary participation in that market is
used to justify the mandate as an exercise of the Commerce Clause.
This is, in Alexander Hamilton’s phrase, “merely [an] act of
usurpation” which “deserves to be treated as such.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 33,
at 204 (quoted in Printz, 521 U.S. at 924). And because this usurpation of
general police power leaves no apparent “activity that the States may
regulate but Congress may not,” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564, the Individual
Mandate encroaches on the reserved sovereign powers of the States in
violation of the Tenth Amendment.
But that is not all. To uphold the claim of congressional power
underlying the Individual Mandate would also fundamentally alter the very
nature of the relationship between the federal government and the governed.
That relationship is defined, in large part, by the limitations on federal
regulation inherent in the Constitution’s enumeration of congressional
powers. Central to the Framers’ concept of republican government was the
belief that the enumerated powers of the federal government are reciprocally
related to the retained rights of the people. By delegating certain legislative
powers to the national government, the people consented to abide by the
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laws enacted by the federal government pursuant to those powers. But as to
those matters over which the national government had no enumerated power,
the people had a retained right to do as they pleased, free of federal
regulation. See Charles Cooper, Limited Government and Individual
Liberty: The Ninth Amendment’s Forgotten Lessons, 4 J. OF L. & POLITICS
63, 64 (1987). Indeed, many of the Framers opposed the incorporation of a
Bill of Rights in the Constitution for fear that an attempt to “enumerate” the
rights of the people would carry the risk that any omission from the list
would be construed to grant Congress an implied, unenumerated power to
legislate on the subject at issue. Id. at 69-70.8 The Framers sought to
protect against this danger with the Ninth Amendment’s guaranty that “[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people.”

8

This concern was succinctly expressed by James Wilson in the
Pennsylvania ratifying convention: “If we attempt an enumeration [of
rights], every thing that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The
consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied
power into the scale of the government, and the rights of the people would
be rendered incomplete.” 2 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 436 (reprint 1966) (J.
Elliot 2d ed. 1836) (statement of J. Wilson at Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, Oct. 28, 1787). Wilson thought that “an omission in the
enumeration of the powers of government is neither so dangerous nor
important as an omission in the enumeration of the rights of the people.” Id.
at 436-437.
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In short, the limited and enumerated “powers granted” to the national
government in Article I and the unlimited and unenumerated “rights
retained” by the people in the Ninth Amendment are two sides of the same
coin. See THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 432 (G. Hunt. Ed. 1904) (letter
to G. Washington dated Dec. 5, 1789). And the Framers conceived of the
people’s reserved rights as ranging from the fundamental to the mundane,
from the rights of free speech and assembly to an individual’s “right to wear
his hat if he pleased.”9 There is little doubt that, somewhere along that
continuum, the Framers would have placed the right of an individual to
decide for herself which products and services she wishes to buy.10 After
all, as the Government concedes, the event that triggers imposition of the

9

During the debates on the Bill of Rights, Congressman Sedgwick of
Massachusetts objected that no amendment protecting free assembly was
needed, for “it is a self-evident, inalienable right which the people possess
… [and] that never would be called in question.” He argued that, if
Congress were going to “descend to such minutiae,” it may as well “have
declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased; that he
might get up when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought proper; but [I]
would ask the gentleman whether he thought it necessary to enter these
trifles in a declaration of rights, in a Government where none of them were
intended to be infringed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 759 (J. Gales & W.
Seaton ed. 1834).
10

The right not to buy an unwanted product has an honored American
pedigree. The colonists in Boston and elsewhere boycotted tea and other
products bearing the imprimatur of the Crown, and even King George III did
not claim a sovereign power to compel his American subjects to buy English
products.
29

Case: 10-2347 Document: 17

Date Filed: 01/25/2011

Page: 35

Individual Mandate – and its penalties – is a decision not to act. And even if
the decision not to buy a product can fairly be characterized as an economic
decision, the fact remains that the only regulated event is the naked decision
itself – the mental process of thinking. The Government’s defense of the
Individual Mandate thus rests on a twisted revision of Descartes’ syllogism:
“I think (about commerce), therefore I am (engaging in commerce).” But
the Constitution sounds in law, not metaphysics, and there is no place in a
federal government of limited and enumerated powers for this sort of
Cartesian Commerce Clause. 11
CONCLUSION
A federal law that conscripts state officials into participating in a
federal regulatory regime enacted under the Commerce Clause infringes on
the reserved state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment. See
Printz, 521 U.S. at 925, 928, 935. The Individual Mandate goes farther,

11

Certainly the monetary punishment imposed by the federal
government for thinking about not buying health insurance is no mere
philosophical exercise. Although “governments need and have ample power
to punish . . . acts,” it “does not follow that they must have a further power
to punish thought . . . as distinguished from acts.” Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). Contemplating even the
most heinous crime is not punishable until one commits an overt act or
actively conspires with others. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10,
16 (1994) (the law “does not punish mere thought; the criminal agreement
itself is the actus reus”).
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invading not only the State’s constitutionally protected sphere of sovereign
autonomy, but the individual’s. If Congress’ power to regulate interstate
commerce is expanded to enable it to force individual citizens to buy
products they do not want, then little if anything will be left of the retained
rights guaranteed by the Ninth Amendment, or of the distinction between a
citizen and a subject.12 Accordingly, amicus curiae respectfully submits that
the judgment of the court below should be reversed and the case remanded
for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted,
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“[T]he term citizen brings into prominence the rights and privileges
of the status, rather than its correlative obligations, while the reverse is the
case with the term subject.” John William Salmond, JURISPRUDENCE § 39
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